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THE TRUTH-ON-THE-MARKET
DEFENSE AND ITS RELEVANCE IN SEC
ENFORCEMENT ACTIONS
LUCY CHANG *
I
INTRODUCTION
1

The efficient capital market hypothesis —a financial theory that posits that
security prices reflect all relevant information available to the market—first
2
found its way into Supreme Court jurisprudence in Basic Inc. v. Levinson. In
that case, the Court adopted a new framework within which to evaluate
securities-fraud claims. Subsequent cases recognized logical extensions of the
efficient market hypothesis in the context of securities fraud, including fraudon-the-market reliance and the truth-on-the-market defense against materiality.
Two recent district-court cases, however, indicate that the hypothesis itself and,
consequently, the legal theories based upon that hypothesis, are not well
understood: These courts rejected the use of the truth-on-the-market defense
3
based on logic inconsistent with the efficient market hypothesis.
The securities antifraud provisions of the Securities Exchange Act have long
been recognized to authorize both official SEC enforcement as well as private
litigation. Although key elements of a successful cause of action under the
securities antifraud provisions—such as material misrepresentation, a
connection between the misrepresentation and the purchase or sale of a
security, and scienter—remain the same, the full requirements for SEC
enforcement actions and private suits differ in certain aspects. Notably,
although private litigants are required to demonstrate reliance, causation, and
injury, the SEC is not. This difference lies in the original basis and purposes of
private litigation versus SEC enforcement: Broad SEC authority is statutorily
granted by Congress to preserve the integrity of the capital markets, while
Copyright © 2014 by Lucy Chang.
This article is also available at http://lcp.law.duke.edu/.
* J.D., 2012, Duke University School of Law; M.A. Economics, 2012, Graduate School, Duke
University. Articles Editor of Law and Contemporary Problems Volume 75. I would like to thank the
Law and Contemporary Problems editorial staff for their work in preparing this article for publication.
1. This is also referred to in this note as the “efficient market hypothesis.”
2. 485 U.S. 224 (1988).
3. See SEC v. Mozilo, No. CV 09-3994 JFW, 2010 WL 3656068 (C.D. Cal. Sept. 16, 2010); SEC v.
Reys, 712 F. Supp. 2d 1170 (W.D. Wash. 2010). In both cases, the parties reached joint settlement
agreements, and the defendants consented to entry of final judgments. (See, e.g., Final Judgment as to
Defendant Gary A. Reys, No. 09-cv-1262-RSM (W.D. Wash. Oct. 26, 2010), ECF No. 25; Final
Judgment as to Defendant David Sambol, No. CV 09-3994 JFW (C.D. Cal. Oct. 15, 2010), ECF No.
487.
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private litigation emerged in a form similar to the common-law tort of
misrepresentation and deceit. Therefore, the SEC enjoys the ability to seek
remedies under its broad statutory authority that are unavailable to private
4
litigants.
In private suits, one way for defendants to rebut allegations of material
misrepresentations in securities offerings is the truth-on-the-market defense.
5
Grounded in the efficient capital market hypothesis, the truth-on-the-market
defense essentially claims that, in light of corrective information credibly
entering the market and being reflected in the price of a security, an alleged
misstatement or omission is rendered immaterial and cannot mislead investors.
Thus, a successful truth-on-the-market defense rebuts assertions of the
materiality of the misstatement or omission in question—an element required
of both SEC enforcement actions and private suits. However, the frequent use
of this defense in fraud-on-the-market cases has perhaps clouded the grounding
of the truth-on-the-market defense in the materiality inquiry. Such confusion is
demonstrated by two recent district-court cases in the Ninth Circuit—SEC v.
6
7
Reys and SEC v. Mozilo —in which defendants were denied access to the truthon-the-market defense based on imperfect understandings of its underlying
basis. Although the truth-on-the-market defense has clearly been recognized by
federal courts in private suits, it has rarely been asserted in SEC enforcement
actions. Hence, it remains of questionable application in SEC enforcement
actions.
In this note I consider the efficient market hypothesis as adopted by the
Court and its application in the securities-fraud context, particularly through
the development and application of the truth-on-the-market defense. Part II
discusses the basic principles of the efficient market hypothesis. Part III then
looks to section 10(b) of the Exchange Act and Rule 10b–5 and the basic
elements required under these causes of action for securities fraud. Part IV
continues with a discussion of the truth-on-the-market defense, while Part V
considers the rationales of two recent Ninth Circuit cases foreclosing that
defense in SEC actions. Part VI then considers whether any intrinsic difference
between the SEC and private litigants warrants limitation of the truth-on-themarket defense to only private suits, ultimately finding no reasonable basis for
such a limitation. Although in both SEC v. Reys and SEC v. Mozilo the court
considered the truth-on-the-market defense as solely a defense to the reliance
element of a private action pursuant to section 10(b) of the Exchange Act and
Rule 10b–5, the truth-on-the-market defense also bears upon the materiality of
the alleged misstatement. Because materiality remains an essential element to
4. Palmer T. Heenan et al., Securities Fraud, 47 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 1015, 1070–71 (2010) (citing
15 U.S.C. §§ 77h-1(c)(1), 78u-2(a-b), (e), 78u-3(c)(1), 80a-9(e), 80b-3(j) (2006)). Note that monetary
penalties also require willful violation of federal securities law. Id. at 1071.
5. Under the efficient capital market hypothesis, all relevant material known to the market is
reflected in the security’s price, including both the original misstatement and its correction.
6. 712 F. Supp. 2d 1170.
7. 2010 WL 3656068.
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an SEC enforcement action, defendants in section 10(b) and Rule 10b–5 actions
should be permitted to raise the truth-on-the-market defense in SEC
enforcement actions as well as private actions.
II
THE EFFICIENT CAPITAL MARKET HYPOTHESIS
The efficient capital market hypothesis contains two basic premises: (1) a
security’s price encapsulates all publicly available information about the firm,
and (2) security prices “react almost instantaneously and in an unbiased manner
8
to any new information.” The theory presupposes that the market in question
is “efficient” or “well-developed.” Further, the source of public information
does not matter for efficient markets: All public information that could affect
securities’ prices will be digested by market participants and reflected in
9
securities’ prices. In the legal context, however, the source of public
information matters: The Supreme Court’s adoption of the efficient market
theory insists upon dissemination of information by a credible source for
10
correction of a misrepresentation.
Correct application of the efficient capital market hypothesis necessarily
begins with a definition of an efficient market. Eugene Fama, whose scholarship
strongly supported the wide acceptance of the efficient market hypothesis,
defined an efficient market as “a market where there are large numbers of
rational, profit-maximizers actively competing, with each trying to predict
future market values of individual securities, and where important current
11
information is almost freely available to all participants.” Unfortunately, this
definition does not provide a specific baseline to evaluate whether a market is
indeed efficient. Courts have considered many factors in determining whether a
given security trades on an efficient market, including:
the average weekly trading volume expressed as a percentage of total outstanding
shares; (2) the number of securities analysts following and reporting on the stock; (3)

8. Roger J. Dennis, Materiality and the Efficient Capital Market Model: A Recipe for the Total
Mix, 25 WM. & MARY L. REV. 373, 374–75 (1984). Dennis also provides a discussion of the various
forms tested of the efficient market model. Id. at 375–81.
9. Robert Norman Sobol, The Benefit of the Internet: The World Wide Web and the Securities Law
Doctrine of Truth-on-the-Market, 25 J. CORP. L. 85, 87 (1999–2000).
10. Basic Inc. v. Levinson, 485 U.S. 224, 229 (1988). For further information, see discussion infra
Part IV.
11. Eugene F. Fama, Random Walks in Stock Market Prices, in ECONOMICS OF CORPORATION
LAW AND SECURITIES REGULATION 156, 157 (Richard A. Posner & Kenneth E. Scott eds., 1980). This
definition will be referenced throughout the remainder of this article. Although other definitions of an
efficient market have been presented, these definitions are not useful, because they merely define the
term in a circular fashion by stating that a market is efficient if prices fully reflect all public information.
See, e.g., Asher v. Baxter Int’l, Inc., 377 F.3d 727, 731 (7th Cir. 2004) (“In an efficient capital market, all
information known to the public affects the price”); William H. Beaver, The Nature of Mandated
Disclosure, in ECONOMICS OF CORPORATION LAW AND SECURITIES REGULATION, supra, at 317, 328
(defining an efficient market as one where “with respect to some defined information . . . the security
prices in that market ‘fully reflect’ that information” and “prices act as if everyone possessed that
information and were able to interpret its implications for security prices” (emphasis in original)).
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the extent to which market makers and arbitrageurs trade in the stock; (4) the
company’s eligibility to file SEC registration Form S-3 . . . ; (5) the existence of
empirical facts ‘showing a cause and effect relationship between unexpected corporate
events or financial releases and an immediate response in the market price’; (6) the
company’s market capitalization; (7) the bid-ask spread for stock
sales; and (8) float,
12
the stock’s trading volume without counting insider-owned stock.

In accordance with the Supreme Court’s acceptance of the efficient market
hypothesis in its jurisprudence, SEC rules explicitly endorse the efficient market
hypothesis with respect to large issuers. In permitting short-form registration,
the SEC stated its belief “that larger seasoned issuers attract a large market
13
following and operate in an efficient market.” The agency noted that these
issuers “are followed by sophisticated institutional and retail investors,
members of the financial press, and numerous sell-side and buy-side analysts
14
that actively seek new information on a continual basis.” Therefore, the SEC
permits these issuers to issue securities under abbreviated registration Form S15
3, fulfilling disclosure requirements through prior SEC filings.
The efficient capital market hypothesis is not without its critics, particularly
16
in financial circles. However, such criticism has not altered either the courts’ or
the SEC’s legal analysis.

12. Unger v. Amedisys Inc., 401 F.3d 316, 323 (5th Cir. 2005) (listing factors previously considered
by other courts). The Fifth Circuit noted that this list was not exhaustive and further cautioned that
courts should consider these factors “analytically, . . . as each of them represents a distinct facet of
market efficiency” and that “not all cases will require all of these factors.” Id.
13. The Regulation of Securities Offerings, Securities Act Release No. 7606A, Exchange Act
Release No. 40,632A, Investment Company Act Release No. 23,519A, 63 Fed. Reg. 67,174, 67,176
(proposed Nov. 13, 1998) (to be codified at 17 C.F.R. pts. 200, 202, 210, 228, 229, 230, 232, 239, 240 &
249).
14. Securities Offering Reform, Securities Act Release No. 33-8591, Exchange Act Release No.
52,056, Investment Company Act Release No. 26,993, 70 Fed. Reg. 44,722 (Aug. 3, 2005).
15. 17 C.F.R. § 239.13 (2013). Following rules promulgated in accordance with the Dodd-Frank
Act, one of the following criteria must be met for an issuer to be eligible to file securities using Form S3: (1) the aggregate market value of the voting and nonvoting common equity held by nonaffiliates of
the registrant must be $75 million of more; (2) the issuer must have issued at least $1 billion in
nonconvertible registered securities within the three years prior; (3) the issuer must have at least $750
million of nonconvertible registered securities outstanding; (4) the issuer must be a “wholly-owned
subsidiary of a well-known seasoned issuer as defined in” 17 C.F.R. § 230.405 (2013); (5) the issuer
must be a “majority-owned operating partnership of a real estate investment trust that qualifies as a
well-known seasoned issuer”; or (5) the issuer must state both its “reasonable belief that it would have
been eligible” to register the proposed securities under Form S-3 as existed before the new rules and
the basis for its reasonable belief while also filing within three years of the effective date of the new
regulations. 17 C.F.R. § 239.13(b)(1)–(2) (2013).
16. See, e.g., Robert J. Shiller et al., Stock Prices and Social Dynamics, 2 BROOKINGS PAPERS ON
ECON. ACTIVITY 457 (1984); Andrew W. Lo, Reconciling Efficient Markets with Behavioral Finance:
The Adaptive Markets Hypothesis, 7 J. OF INVESTMENT CONSULTING 21 (2005). Widely circulated
newspapers and magazines have also noted existing critiques of the efficient capital market theory,
particularly in the wake of the recent credit crisis. See, e.g., Efficiency and Beyond, ECONOMIST, July
18, 2009, at 72; Jeremy J. Siegel, Efficient Market Theory and the Crisis, WALL ST. J., Oct. 27, 2009, at
A23.

1 CHANG (DO NOT DELETE)

Nos. 3 & 4 2013]

3/19/2014 11:37 AM

THE TRUTH-ON-THE-MARKET DEFENSE

345

III
EXCHANGE ACT SECTION 10(B) AND RULE 10B–5 CAUSES OF ACTION
Exchange Act section 10(b), which is codified at 15 U.S.C. § 78j(b), states,
It shall be unlawful for any person, directly or indirectly, by the use of any means or
instrumentality of interstate commerce or of the mails, or of any facility of any
national securities exchange . . .
(b) To use or employ, in connection with the purchase or sale of any security
registered on a national securities exchange or any security not so registered, or
any securities-based swap agreement, any manipulative or deceptive device or
contrivance in contravention of such rules and regulations as the Commission
may prescribe as necessary
or appropriate in the public interest or for the
17
protection of investors.

Pursuant to its authority under the Exchange Act, the SEC adopted Rule
10b–5, which corresponds to section 10(b) and is codified at 17 C.F.R. §
240.10b–5. Rule 10b–5 states,
It shall be unlawful for any person, directly or indirectly, by the use of any means or
instrumentality of interstate commerce, or of the mails or of any facility of any
national securities exchange,
(a) To employ any device, scheme, or artifice to defraud,
(b) To make any untrue statement of a material fact or to omit to state a
material fact necessary in order to make the statements made, in the light of the
circumstances under which they were made, not misleading, or
(c) To engage in any act, practice, or course of business which operates or would
operate as a fraud or
deceit upon any person, in connection with the purchase or
18
sale of any security.

It is well-settled that the Exchange Act and its corresponding rules permit
19
both SEC enforcement action and private suits. However, the elements
required for a private suit differ from those required for SEC enforcement
20
actions. The basic elements of a private suit are: “(1) a material
misrepresentation (or omission); (2) scienter . . . ; (3) a connection with the
purchase or sale of a security; (4) reliance . . . ; (5) economic loss; [and] (6) loss
21
causation.” The SEC, on the other hand, must demonstrate that the defendant
“(1) made a misrepresentation or omission (2) of material fact, (3) with scienter,
(4) in connection with the purchase or sale of securities, and (5) by virtue of the
22
requisite jurisdictional means.” Notably, unlike private litigants alleging
17. 15 U.S.C. § 78j (2006 & Supp. V 2011).
18. 17 C.F.R. § 240.10b–5 (2011).
19. See generally Amanda M. Rose, Reforming Securities Litigation Reform: Restructuring the
Relationship Between Public and Private Enforcement of Rule 10b–5, 108 COLUM. L. REV. 1301 (2008)
(providing criticism of the current regime of concurrent public and private suits given the stated
objectives of the securities-regulation scheme).
20. Note that the SEC may choose among several alternative remedies, including cease-and-desist
orders and monetary penalties, which are unavailable to private litigants, due to its broader authority to
protect investors. Regardless of the remedies sought, however, the SEC must demonstrate the same
elements to establish a violation of section 10(b) of the Exchange Act and Rule 10b–5.
21. Dura Pharm. v. Broudo, 544 U.S. 336, 341–42 (2005) (emphasis omitted) (citations omitted)
(internal quotation marks omitted).
22. SEC v. Wolfson, 539 F. 3d 1249, 1256 (10th Cir. 2008) (quoting Geman v. SEC, 334 F. 3d 1183,
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section 10(b) or Rule 10b–5 claims, the SEC need not demonstrate reliance or
23
injury.
This difference is historically based. Originally, private actions and SEC
enforcement actions served different purposes: SEC actions served “to deter
securities fraud in order to promote society’s collective interest in the integrity
and efficiency of the capital markets,” while private action aimed “to
compensate defrauded investors for their discrete losses—much like a common
24
law claim for misrepresentation and deceit.” Thus, successful private suits
naturally continue to require a direct causal link to a discrete injury suffered by
the private investor. In contrast, the SEC’s authority stems from statutory
recognition of the social benefits of well-ordered capital markets and the
potential harm to society posed by threats to these markets’ integrity—such as
misrepresentations—regardless of actual reliance or injury.
Because the truth-on-the-market defense to a 10b–5 claim was first
recognized in the private-suit context, it may be helpful to discuss two key
elements of a private cause of action: (1) the materiality of a misstatement or
omission and (2) reliance on such misstatement or omission.
A. Materiality
In TSC Industries, Inc. v. Northway, Inc., the Supreme Court announced a
new test for materiality known as the “total mix” standard, whereby a statement
or omission was deemed material if “a substantial likelihood [exists] that the
disclosure of the omitted fact would have been viewed by the reasonable
investor as having significantly altered the ‘total mix’ of information made
25
available.” The total-mix standard is objective: “Investors are not entitled to
all of the information they would like to have about a company,” and a
26
particular investor’s specific preferences do not establish materiality. Rather,
the inquiry focuses on a “reasonable investor” with knowledge of “information
27
available in the public domain.” The presumption that an investor has
knowledge of public information is consistent with the efficient market

1192 (10th Cir. 2003)).
23. Id. Multiple circuit and district courts have announced similar exceptions. See also SEC v.
Rana Research, Inc., 8 F.3d 1358, 1363–64 (9th Cir. 1993) (joining the Sixth and Second Circuits in
holding the SEC is not required to prove reliance in its seeking injunctive relief based on violations of
section 10(b) and Rule 10b–5); SEC v. Reys, 712 F. Supp. 2d 1170, 1173 (W.D. Wash. 2010) (requiring
only that the SEC demonstrate misstatement or omission of material fact made with scienter); SEC v.
Kearns, 691 F. Supp. 2d 601, 614 (D.N.J. 2010) (finding that, unlike private litigants, the SEC “need not
prove either reliance or damages”); SEC v. Prater, 296 F. Supp. 2d 210, 215 (D. Conn. 2003) (holding
the SEC is not required to either allege or prove investor reliance on misrepresentations).
24. Rose, supra note 19, at 1310 (citing Kardon v. Nat’l Gypsum Co., 69 F.Supp. 512, 513 (E.D. Pa.
1946)); see also Dura Pharm., 544 U.S. at 341 (commenting that “[t]he courts have implied from these
statutes and Rule [10b–5] a private damages action, which resembles, but is not identical to, commonlaw tort actions for deceit and misrepresentation.” (citations omitted)).
25. TSC Indus., Inc. v. Northway, Inc., 426 U.S. 438, 449 (1976).
26. Sobol, supra note 9, at 89.
27. Whirlpool Fin. Corp. v. GN Holdings, Inc., 67 F.3d 605, 610 (7th Cir. 1995).
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hypothesis, which states that a security’s price reflects all relevant material
information. The Basic Court further clarified that, for “contingent” or
“speculative” events, “materiality ‘will depend at any given time upon a
balancing of both the indicated probability that the event will occur and the
anticipated magnitude of the event in light of the totality of the company
28
activity.’”
Notwithstanding its acceptance of the efficient market hypothesis, the Court
has emphasized that price movement alone is insufficient to establish or rebut
29
materiality. The materiality inquiry is truly “fact-specific” and “depends on the
significance the reasonable investor would place on the withheld or
30
misrepresented information” in light of all information.
B. Reliance
To prevail on a 10b–5 claim, private plaintiffs must also demonstrate
causation and injury resulting from the misstatement or omission in question. In
Basic, the Supreme Court noted that “[r]eliance provides the requisite causal
31
connection between a defendant’s misrepresentation and a plaintiff’s injury.”
Citing Congress’s belief that information affects securities markets and
empirical support for that belief, the Court concluded that class-action plaintiffs
could establish 10b–5 violations through either direct reliance or its newly
32
recognized “fraud-on-the-market” presumption of reliance.
In fraud-on-the-market pleadings, plaintiffs assert reliance only upon the
traded prices of securities. Because “in an open and developed securities
market, the price of a company’s stock is determined by the available material
information regarding the company and its business,” misstatements impact a
security’s price and therefore may “defraud purchasers of stock even if the
33
purchasers do not directly rely on the misstatements.” Thus, “[r]eliance may
be presumed when a fraudulent misrepresentation or omission impairs the

28. Basic Inc. v. Levinson, 485 U.S. 224, 238 (1988) (quoting SEC v. Tex. Gulf Sulphur Co., 401
F.2d 833, 849 (2d Cir. 1968)); see also Matrix Capital Mgmt. Fund, LP v. BearingPoint, Inc., 576 F.3d
172, 184–85, 187 (4th Cir. 2009) (reaffirming considerations of probability and magnitude).
29. Dura Pharm., 544 U.S. at 343 (“[A] lower price may reflect, not the earlier misrepresentation,
but changed economic circumstances, changed investor expectations, new industry-specific or
firm-specific facts, conditions, or other events, which taken separately or together account for some or
all of that lower price. . . . Given the tangle of factors affecting price, the most logic alone permits us to
say is that the higher purchase price will sometimes play a role in bringing about a future
loss.”(emphasis in original)); see also Ganino v. Citizens Util. Co., 228 F.3d 154, 167 (2d Cir. 2000)
(finding that, at the summary-judgment stage of the litigation, the district court erred in deeming the
misstatements immaterial based on lack of movement in the stock’s price following disclosure of
corrective information).
30. Basic, 485 U.S. at 240.
31. Id. at 243 (citations omitted).
32. Id. at 245–46. Specifically, the Court noted that “[r]ecent empirical studies have tended to
confirm Congress’ premise that the market price of shares traded on well-developed markets reflects all
publicly available information, and hence any material misrepresentations. Id.
33. Id. at 241–42 (quoting Peil v. Speiser, 806 F.2d 1154, 1160–61 (3d Cir. 1986)).

1 CHANG (DO NOT DELETE)

348

3/19/2014 11:37 AM

LAW AND CONTEMPORARY PROBLEMS

[Vol. 76:341

34

value of a security traded in an efficient market,” although this presumption is
35
rebuttable. However, this presumption of reliance is only reasonable if
36
markets are indeed efficient.
Fraud-on-the-market reliance and the truth-on-the-market defense both
37
find initial recognition in Basic. This simultaneous recognition may cloud the
fact that these two doctrines impact different elements of securities-fraud
claims. Confusion is further compounded by case law, because the truth-on-themarket doctrine has most commonly been asserted when private plaintiffs assert
fraud-on-the-market reliance. This difference, however, is crucial to
understanding the role the truth-in-the-market defense plays in securities-fraud
suits, particularly in SEC enforcement actions where reliance need not be
demonstrated.
IV
THE TRUTH-ON-THE-MARKET DEFENSE
Under the efficient market hypothesis adopted by the courts, a security’s
price reflects the total mix of all material information that credibly enters the
market. In asserting the judicially created truth-on-the-market defense, a
defendant claims that, according to the efficient market hypothesis, even if a
particular statement would have been misleading on its own, corrective
information credibly entered the market to counteract any misleading effect. As
38
such, the market is not misled. In other words, if a misrepresentation and its
correction “are transmitted to the market with roughly equal intensity and
credibility, the market will receive complete and accurate information” and the

34. Malack v. BDO Seidman, LLP, 617 F.3d 743, 747 (3d Cir. 2010) (quoting Newton v. Merrill
Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc., 259 F.3d 154, 175 (3d Cir. 2001)); see also In re Apple Computer
Sec. Litig., 886 F.2d 1109, 1113–14 (9th Cir. 1989) (noting plaintiff is presumed to have indirectly relied
on the misstatement “by relying on the integrity of the stock price established by the market.”) The
fraud-on-the-market presumption facilitates class-action suits by permitting reliance to be
demonstrated on behalf of the entire class, rather than on an individual plaintiff basis: Requiring
individual plaintiffs to demonstrate reliance would essentially prevent a class-action suit under Federal
Rule of Civil Procedure 23, because individual issues would then predominate over common questions
of law or fact. Basic, 485 U.S. 224, 242 (1988). See generally, James D. Cox, Making Securities Fraud
Class Actions Virtuous, 39 ARIZ. L. REV. 497 (1997) (providing further insight into the use of classaction suits in securities regulation).
35. Sobol, supra note 9, at 89.
36. Asher v. Baxter Int’l, Inc., 377 F.3d 727, 731–32 (7th Cir. 2004); see also Unger v. Amedisys
Inc., 401 F.3d 316, 322 (5th Cir. 2005) (citing Basic, 485 U.S. at 248–49); Dennis, supra note 8, at 406
(“The doctrine of market reliance depends on a belief in the efficient market model.”). As discussed in
part I, demonstrating that a market is efficient may prove problematic; however, the Fifth Circuit has
noted that “[i]n many cases, where heavily-traded or well known stocks are the targets of suits, market
efficiency will not even be an issue.” Unger, 401 F.3d at 322.
37. Basic, 485 U.S. at 247–49 (permitting reliance to be shown under a fraud-on-the-market theory
and indicating, as examples, that a showing that “‘market makers’ were privy to the truth” or that
“news . . . credibly entered the market and dissipated the effects of the misstatements” may break
causation under that theory because no fraud was transmitted through the market price).
38. In re Stac Elecs. Sec. Litig., 89 F.3d 1399, 1409 (9th Cir. 1996) (citing Kaplan v. Rose, 49 F.3d
1363, 1376 (9th Cir. 1994)).
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security’s price “will accurately reflect all relevant information,” including both
39
the misrepresentation and the correction.
At first glance, the case law seems to suggest two possible bases for the
truth-on-the-market defense, both stemming from the efficient market
hypothesis. The first is that the defense rebuts the materiality of the
misstatement or omission: Through the dissemination of corrective information,
the misstatement or omission is rendered immaterial. The second is that the
defense negates reliance: Credibly disseminated corrective information is
reflected in the security’s price and, as such, the plaintiff cannot have relied on
the misstatement or omission in purchasing the security. Closer investigation of
the case law, however, indicates that the truth-on-the-market defense is
properly grounded in the materiality inquiry, not the reliance inquiry.
As mentioned above, the truth-on-the-market defense finds its roots in
Basic. In that case, the Court specifically noted that the case required
application of the materiality requirement of section 10(b) of the Exchange Act
40
and Rule 10b–5. Thus, the Court’s dicta in Basic opening the door to the truthon-the-market defense suggests the defense rebuts the materiality element of a
section 10(b) and Rule 10b–5 cause of action. Perhaps confusingly, however, the
Court also stated that “[a]ny showing that severs the link between the alleged
misrepresentation and either the price received (or paid) by the plaintiff, or his
decision to trade at a fair market price, will be sufficient to rebut the
41
presumption of reliance.” Thus, “if despite [the] allegedly fraudulent attempt
to manipulate market price, new information . . . credibly entered the market
and dissipated the effects of the misstatements, those who traded . . . after the
corrective statements would have no direct or indirect connection with the
42
fraud.” Although the Court’s phrasing may suggest the truth-on-the-market
defense breaks causation, when considered in the context of the efficient
market hypothesis, its statement is properly understood as being grounded in
the materiality inquiry. Truth-on-the-market “severs the link between the
alleged misrepresentation and . . . the price” because the market price reflects
both the misstatement and the corrective information. In other words, credible
corrective information renders the misstatement immaterial because the market
has the full picture of that security and further disclosure will not affect the total
mix of available information.
Several circuit-court decisions applying the efficient market hypothesis
employ reasoning consistent with this understanding. Although not a section
10(b) and Rule 10b–5 case, the Seventh Circuit’s decision in Wielgos v.
Commonwealth Edison Co. provides an example of reasoning consistent with
the efficient market hypothesis. In that case, a private plaintiff alleged that
Commonwealth Edison violated section 11 of the Securities Act of 1933 by
39.
40.
41.
42.

In re Apple Computer, 886 F.2d at 1114.
Basic, 485 U.S. at 226 (emphasis added).
Id. at 248–49 (dicta).
Id.
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fraudulently “underestimat[ing] the completion costs of [nuclear] reactors”
because cost projections were inaccurate and internal cost estimates already
43
exceeded the projections at the time the shares were issued. The Seventh
Circuit held that a dated projection was not misleading in light of corrective
44
information known to market professionals. Correctly analyzing the case
under the efficient market hypothesis, the court found that “[k]nowledge
abroad in the market moderated . . . likely eliminated, the potential of a dated
45
projection to mislead.” The Seventh Circuit considered the corrective
information to be a rebuttal to the materiality of the projection and considered
46
the substance of the alleged misstatement. Although the court later states,
somewhat confusingly, that the case “may be decided . . . without regard to
47
materiality,” that statement’s context does not suggest that corrective
information fails to rebut materiality, but rather indicates the court’s belief that
the corporation’s disclosures were not misleading and thus required no rebuttal.
In the same year, the Ninth Circuit, in In re Apple Computer Securities
Litigation, found that corrective information provided to the market through
48
intense press scrutiny negated alleged misstatements. Private plaintiffs claimed
fraud-on-the-market, alleging that defendants’ “unqualified optimism”
regarding the prospects of its new computer, “Lisa,” and compatible disk-drive,
“Twiggy,” was “false and misleading” and thereby defrauded investors in
49
violation of section 10(b) of the Exchange Act and Rule 10b–5.
The Ninth Circuit first distinguished between assertions of actual reliance
and fraud-on-the-market reliance. Although in cases of actual reliance, “it does
not matter that the market is aware of the facts necessary to make the statement
not misleading,” because that plaintiff may have been misled to believe the
market incorrectly valued the security, in fraud-on-the-market cases, plaintiffs
concede that their purchases were induced by the “artificial stock price set by
the market in light of statements made by the insiders as well as all other
50
material public information.” Thus, for fraud-on-the-market cases, the court
reasoned that “[p]rovided that they have credibly entered the market through
other means, the facts allegedly omitted by the defendant would already be
51
reflected in the stock’s price.” This reasoning is consistent with the efficient
43. Wielgos v. Commonwealth Edison Co., 892 F.2d 509, 511–12 (7th Cir. 1989).
44. Id. at 516.
45. Id.
46. Id. at 516 (dicta).
47. Id. at 517.
48. In re Apple Computer Sec. Litig., 886 F.2d 1109, 1115 (9th Cir. 1989). Note that the Ninth
Circuit stressed the limits of its holding that intense press scrutiny was sufficient in this case to
counteract the misrepresentations of corporate insiders. Id. at 1116. (“Scrutiny by the press will not
ordinarily excuse [this] type of unqualified exuberance.”).
49. Id. at 1112. Although “Lisa contained a number of technological innovations which later
proved to be commercially viable when incorporated into the ‘Macintosh’ home computer,” Lisa and
Twiggy themselves were not commercial successes. Id. at 1111.
50. Id. at 1114.
51. Id.
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market hypothesis.
The Ninth Circuit remanded the Twiggy claims for presentation to a jury
because the evidence suggested “genuine issues of material fact” with respect to
two statements, but upheld a grant of summary judgment for claims involving
52
Lisa and Apple generally because no such issues existed for these claims. The
Ninth Circuit found that, “[a]lthough plaintiffs allege that Apple did not fairly
and adequately inform the market about Lisa’s prospects, many of the risks and
53
underlying problems were widely publicized.” The court summarized:
The press portrayed Lisa as a gamble, with the potential for either enormous success
or enormous failure. At least twenty articles stressed the risks Apple was taking, and
detailed the underlying problems producing those risks. Many of the optimistic
statements challenged by plaintiffs appeared in those same articles, essentially
bracketed by the facts which plaintiffs claim Apple wrongfully
failed to disclose. The
54
market could not have been made more aware of Lisa’s risks.

The Ninth Circuit cited as one example a Business Week article which quoted
Steven Jobs, Apple’s former Chairman of the Board, as believing “Apple would
have little trouble selling Lisa,” while also noting the wide variance of expert
estimates of Lisa sales (“from 2,000 to 30,000”), indicating the uncertainty of
55
the venture. The Ninth Circuit also noted a Wall Street Journal article which
“detail[ed] Apple’s difficulties in achieving IBM-compatibility, in attracting
independent software suppliers, and in raising consumer interest at $9,995”
while including Jobs’s prediction that “Lisa [would] be ‘phenomenally
56
successful.’”
In finding this evidence sufficient to counteract Apple’s optimistic
statements, the Ninth Circuit cautioned, “[s]crutiny by the press will not
ordinarily excuse the type of unqualified exuberance expressed by Apple and its
officers in this case” because of the “heavy reliance” investors “justifiably”
57
place on the views of corporate insiders. Thus, “[i]n order to avoid Rule 10b–5
liability, any material information which insiders fail to disclose must be
transmitted to the public with a degree of intensity and credibility sufficient to
effectively counterbalance any misleading impression created by the insiders’
58
one-sided representations.” The Ninth Circuit summarized the central issue as
“whether, in light of the press’ documentation of Lisa’s risks, a rational jury
could nonetheless find a ‘substantial likelihood’ that full disclosures by Apple
would have ‘significantly altered the “total mix” of information made
59
available.’”

52.
53.
54.
55.
56.
57.
58.
59.

Id. at 1116, 1119.
Id. at 1112.
Id. at 1116.
Id. at 1112.
Id.
Id. at 1116.
Id.
Id. at 1115 (quoting TSC Indus., Inc. v. Northway, Inc., 426 U.S. 438, 449 (1976)).
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In so defining the issue, the Ninth Circuit clearly viewed the truth-on-the60
market defense as grounded in materiality. By requiring that corrective
information be of “a degree of intensity and credibility sufficient to effectively
counterbalance” insider misrepresentations, however, the Ninth Circuit
61
somewhat confusingly referred to investor “reliance.” But understood in
context, the use of the term “reliance” does not refer to the reliance element of
the claim, but merely underscores defendants’ heavy burden in showing the
requisite intensity and credibility.
Subsequent cases similarly find a basis for the truth-on-the-market defense
in the materiality inquiry. In In re Stac Electronics Securities Litigation, the
Ninth Circuit again found that information in the public domain corrected an
62
alleged misstatement by the defendants. In that case, private plaintiffs claimed
that defendants “made material misrepresentations or omissions regarding
Stac’s initial public offering,” in violation of sections 11 and 15 of the 1933
63
Securities Act and sections 10(b) and 20 of the Exchange Act. Specifically,
plaintiffs alleged that defendants (1) “failed to disclose imminent competition
from Microsoft and deliberately stalled licensing negotiations with Microsoft in
order to delay Microsoft’s market entry,” and (2) “did not disclose Stac’s
64
‘inevitable’ impending decline.” In dismissing plaintiffs’ sections 11 and 15
65
claims, the district court held that “all of the [alleged] omissions . . . were
either actually disclosed, or need not have been disclosed in Stac’s prospectus,”
and focused its attention on the “gravamen” of the representative plaintiff’s
complaint—namely “Stac’s alleged failure to disclose its knowledge of
66
Microsoft’s plans” to create a competing product. Plaintiff stressed that Stac
“knew that Microsoft was going to come out with a competitive product, but
67
masked this knowledge as a contingency”; however, the district court noted
that the prospectus “ma[de] detailed disclosures concerning the risk of
competition”:

60. Id.
61. Id. at 1116.
62. 89 F.3d 1399, 1410 (9th Cir. 1996).
63. Id. at 1401.
64. Id. at 1403. Plaintiffs also alleged Stac falsified financial statements “by artificially inflating
reported results.” Id. The district court found that the prospectus adequately described the alleged
mechanisms of “artificial inflat[ion]” and their risks and further “advise[d] investors not to predict
future returns on the basis of the results of any single quarter.” Id. at 1407. The Ninth Circuit affirmed
and held that any such misstatements were “more than adequately covered by the bespeaks caution
doctrine.” Id. at 1409. The bespeaks-caution doctrine is a separate defense whereby the presence of
“enough cautionary language or risk disclosure . . . [may] protect the defendant against claims of
securities fraud.” Id. (citing Fecht v. Price Co., 70 F.3d 1078, 1081 (9th Cir. 1995)).
65. Id. at 1404. The district court had dismissed plaintiffs’ section 10(b) claim due to a “failure to
plead scienter with particularity,” as required by Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 9(b), and this decision
was later affirmed by the Ninth Circuit. The district court had dismissed plaintiffs’ section 11 claim, not
under rule 9(b) but rather under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6), “[al]though it applied
similar standards and reasoning” to both the § 10(b) and § 11 claims.” Id. at 1404.
66. Id. at 1405.
67. Id. at 1406 (emphasis in original).
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One developer of a compatible operating system has licensed a competitive data
compression product for incorporation into the latest version of the operating system.
There can be no assurance that Microsoft
. . . will not incorporate a competitive data
68
compression technology in their products.

The Ninth Circuit affirmed the district court’s finding, noting its prior holding
that “multiple [no-assurance] warnings in . . . [a] prospectus” were sufficient to
69
prevent the misleading of investors. Further, because “the market already
knew of the potential for Microsoft’s inclusion of data compression
70
technology,” the statements could not have been misleading.
Regarding plaintiffs’ allegation of a failure to disclose the company’s
71
“‘inevitable’ impending decline” based on weakened product demand due to
customer anticipation of a new product that would render its service
redundant—information unknown to the public—the Ninth Circuit notably
responded that such “customer resistance . . . [was] precisely the sort of market
72
awareness that . . . [had been] held to defeat claims of fraud on the market.”
Specifically, the Ninth Circuit reiterated that “investors know of the risk of
obsolescence posed by older products forced to compete with more advanced
rivals” and that “technical obsolescence . . . in a field marked by rapid
73
technological advances is information within the public domain.” Although the
prospectus “clearly acknowledge[d]” Stac’s “dependence” on the product, the
Ninth Circuit held that, “[e]ven without such disclosures . . . investors could
easily have predicted that if Stac’s key product were to lose its market share, the
74
company would be in serious trouble.” Thus, corrective information “ha[d]
entered the market through other channels” and the “market [was] not . . .
75
misled.” Consistent with the efficient market hypothesis, the Ninth Circuit
considered the allegedly misleading statements in the context of market
knowledge and determined corrective information rendered them immaterial in
the total mix of information.
In Ganino v. Citizens Utilities Company, private plaintiffs alleged that the
defendants had misstated earnings by improperly reporting approximately $10
76
million of 1995 income as 1996 income. They sought to “me[e]t and exceed[]”
analyst’s projections and thereby artificially inflate the stock price, in violation
77
of sections 10(b) and 20(a) of the Exchange Act and Rule 10b–5. Defendants
moved to dismiss plaintiffs’ claims on various grounds, including that “the
68. Id. (emphasis in original).
69. Id. (citing In re Convergent Techs. Sec. Litig., 948 F.2d 507, 515–16 (9th Cir. 1981), aff’d in
relevant part and rev’d in part on other grounds, 459 U.S. 375 (1983)).
70. Id. at 1407. The Ninth Circuit also noted that “another company’s plans cannot be known to a
certainty.” Id.
71. Id. at 1403.
72. Id. at 1409–10 (citing In re Convergent Techs., 948 F.2d at 513).
73. Id. at 1410 (citing In re Convergent Techs., 948 F.2d at 513).
74. Id.
75. Id. at 1409 (citations omitted) (quoting Kaplan v. Rose, 49 F.3d 1363, 1376 (9th Cir. 1994)).
76. 228 F. 3d 154, 157–159, 166 (2d. Cir. 2000).
77. Id.
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nondisclosures at issue were immaterial because the information was already
publicly available”—that is, defendants asserted the truth-on-the-market
78
defense. On appeal, the Second Circuit described truth-on-the-market defense
in terms of materiality: “[A] misrepresentation is immaterial if the information
is already known to the market because the misrepresentation cannot then
79
defraud the market.” Citing In re Apple Computer, the court reaffirmed the
requirement that corrective information be transmitted “‘with a degree of
intensity and credibility sufficient to counter-balance effectively any misleading
80
information created by’ the alleged misstatements.”
In support of its truth-on-the-market defense, defendants argued that the
alleged misstatements were immaterial because Citizen had already disclosed
all the relevant information about the fees in question before the class period.
They pointed to the absence of price movement following filing of its 1997
Second Quarter Form 10-Q for support, which the district court had taken as
81
“significant evidence” of immaterality. The defendants also argued that other
SEC filings submitted during the class period “contained sufficient accurate
information to neutralize any misleading impressions created by Citizens’
82
financial reports.” The Second Circuit rejected this defense based in part on
the “dispute” surrounding the alleged lack of price movement and the
inadequacy of the record regarding “whether [defendants’] disclosures were
83
conveyed with sufficient ‘intensity and credibility.’” Thus, although the Second
Circuit rejected the defense in this case due to insufficiency of the record, its
analysis accorded with the efficient market hypothesis and squarely viewed the
defense as a way to rebut materiality.
Because the truth-on-the-market defense is frequently asserted in fraud-onthe-market cases and the fraud-on-the-market theory is a vehicle for plaintiffs
to demonstrate reliance, it is unsurprising that courts deciding such cases
comment extensively on whether the facts support a plaintiff’s allegation of
reliance on a particular misstatement or omission—even when courts find the
facts do not support such allegations in light of corrective information in the
market. For instance, the Ninth Circuit in In re Apple Computer extensively
discussed “reliance” in describing the fraud-on-the-market theory and the
reliance investors place on insider statements, even though its ultimate decision

78. Id. at 160 (emphasis in original). Note that the district court rendered its decision based solely
on their agreement with defendants’ alternate defense that the allegedly “deceptively stored” fees were
immaterial as a matter of law since they represented only 1.7% of the company’s pretax revenues. The
Second Circuit subsequently rejected the court’s adoption of a numerical benchmark in evaluating
materiality. Id. at 163–64.
79. Id. at 167 (citations omitted).
80. Id. (citing In re Apple Computer Sec. Litig., 886 F.2d 1109, 1116 (9th Cir. 1989))
81. Id. at 167–68. In this filing, Citizens “first publicly acknowledged that the reported income for
the first and second quarters of 1996 included substantial payments from [Hungarian Telephone &
Cable Corporation].” Id.
82. Id. at 167.
83. Id. at 168.

1 CHANG (DO NOT DELETE)

Nos. 3 & 4 2013]

3/19/2014 11:37 AM

THE TRUTH-ON-THE-MARKET DEFENSE

355

84

did not rest on the reliance element. The language used by particular courts
should not overshadow the true grounding of the truth-on-the-market defense
in the materiality inquiry: Credible corrective information renders a
misrepresentation or omission immaterial, in which case it “cannot be the basis
85
of liability.”
V
MISUNDERSTANDING THE EFFICIENT MARKET HYPOTHESIS AND THE TRUTHON-THE-MARKET DEFENSE: SEC V. REYS AND SEC V. MOZILO
Two recent district-court decisions in the Ninth Circuit—SEC v. Reys in the
Western District of Washington and SEC v. Mozilo in the Central District of
California—suggest misunderstandings of the efficient market hypothesis and,
consequently, the grounding of the truth-on-the-market defense in the
materiality inquiry. Because the SEC is not required to demonstrate reliance,
the SEC did not invoke a fraud-on-the-market theory of reliance in either case.
A. SEC v. Reys
In SEC v. Reys, Gary Reys, the Chairman and CEO of CellCyte Genetics
Corporation, allegedly violated Exchange Act section 10(b) and Rule 10b–5 by
“repeatedly misle[a]d[ing] the investing public about CellCyte’s key product, a
86
purported stem cell therapy to treat and repair damaged organs.” The SEC
based its allegations on eight alleged misstatements and omissions “that
individually and collectively amounted to numerous counts of securities
87
fraud.”
The court started its analysis in the materiality inquiry, noting that “[t]o
constitute a violation of the antifraud provisions, the statements or omissions in
88
question must be material.” The standard for determining the materiality of a
misrepresentation or omission was presented as follows: “A misrepresentation
or omission is material if there is a substantial likelihood that a reasonable
investor would have acted differently if the misrepresentation had not been
89
made or the truth had been disclosed.”
Of the eight alleged misstatements and omissions, Reys asserted the truthon-the-market defense for only two statements, referred to as Statements 1 and
2. Statement 1 was that “CellCyte’s discoveries ‘are the first stem cell enabling
drugs to enter Investigational New Drug (“IND”) supported by the United

84. In re Apple Computer, 886 F.2d at 1113–16.
85. Wielgos v. Commonwealth Edison Co., 892 F.2d 509, 516 (2d. Cir. 1989).
86. 712 F. Supp. 2d 1170, 1173 (W.D. Wash. 2010). The SEC also alleged violations of the
“obligation to file accurate quarterly and current reports” under Exchange Act section 13(a) and Rules
12b–20, 13a–11, and 13a–13. Id.
87. Id. at 1173–74.
88. Id. at 1174 (citing Basic Inc. v. Levinson, 485 U.S. 224, 231 (1988)).
89. Id. (citing Livid Holdings Ltd. v. Salomon Smith Barney, Inc., 416 F.3d 940 (9th Cir. 2004)).

1 CHANG (DO NOT DELETE)

356

3/19/2014 11:37 AM

LAW AND CONTEMPORARY PROBLEMS

[Vol. 76:341
90

States Food and Drug Administration (“FDA”) clinical trials.’ However,
CellCyte had neither filed an IND application nor “received any sort of
approval from the FDA to begin clinical trials,” and Reys “knew or should have
91
known” this when making the statement. Reys claimed this statement was
corrected by additional disclosures that (1) the IND “had not yet begun” and
92
(2) “an IND submission was scheduled for the second half of 2007.”
Statement 2 was that “CellCyte’s stem cell research had ‘been proven in
93
extensive late-stage animal studies.’” Actually, Reys “knew that the
preliminary experiments years earlier had achieved positive results in a small
number of mice and that no additional research had been conducted using the
94
special compound since 2002.” Reys claimed this statement was corrected by a
clarification that the company’s “technology [was] at an early stage of
95
development.”
With respect to these statements, the court noted that the truth-on-the96
market defense “probably . . . is not available at the pleadings stage,” and that,
“in any case[,] Reys ha[d] cited no published in-circuit case for the proposition
that the truth on the market doctrine applies to an SEC enforcement action as
opposed to a private securities action based [on] a theory of ‘fraud on the
97
market.’” The court thus characterized the truth-on-the-market defense as
merely “a response to [the] very particular theory of liability in private
securities actions” of fraud-on-the-market and declared it inapplicable to SEC
98
actions such as the one at bar.
In response to all of the alleged misstatements, Reys presented another
defense based on stock-price fluctuation, citing out-of-circuit cases. Reys had
originally argued that “a misstatement or omission is immaterial as a matter of
law where a corrective disclosure has no material effect on the company’s stock
99
price.” The court rejected this argument as having been “roundly rejected by
the Ninth Circuit” because “the market is subject to distortions that prevent the
100
ideal of ‘a free and open public market’ from occurring.” Reys then argued
that “stock prices are just a factor to be considered in assessing the materiality
of certain public statements, and that the price fluctuations in this case indicate
that the immateriality of the statements was so obvious that reasonable minds

90. Id. at 1174.
91. Id. at 1175.
92. Id. (emphasis in original).
93. Id.
94. Id.
95. Id.
96. Id. (citing Asher v. Baxter Int’l, Inc., 377 F.3d 727, 735 (7th Cir. 2004)).
97. Id. (citing In re Convergent Techs. Sec. Litig., 948 F.2d 507, 513 (9th Cir. 1981)).
98. Id.
99. Id. at 1174.
100. Id. (quoting No. 84 Employer-Teamster Joint Council Pension Trust Fund v. Am. W. Holding
Corp., 320 F.3d 920, 934 (9th Cir. 2003)).
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101

could not differ.” This argument was similarly rejected by the court, which
found that “stock price fluctuations surrounding purportedly corrective
disclosures” could not form the basis for a finding of immateriality of alleged
102
misstatements or omissions. Although not stated in the specific context of the
truth-on-the-market
defense,
this
reasoning
suggests
a
possible
misunderstanding of the efficient market hypothesis and the defense itself.
As discussed in part II, the efficient market hypothesis states that, if a
security is traded on an efficient market, all relevant public information is
captured in the security’s price. Although the Reys court states that the
disclosures cited by Reys did not provide the requisite “intensity and
credibility” to counteract Reys’s statements, this was merely dicta: The court’s
holding was that the truth-on-the-market defense did not apply because this was
not a private fraud-on-the-market action. Note that the district court’s
determination that the disclosures in this case did not rise to the level of
“intensity and credibility” required to successfully assert the truth-on-themarket defense is likely correct in light of Ninth Circuit precedent. As such, the
court’s rejection of the truth-on-the-market defense in all SEC enforcement
103
actions was unnecessary. If a defendant can demonstrate the required level of
corrective information, then the efficient market hypothesis states that the
market will reflect that information in the share price.
The court’s rejection of Reys’s argument regarding share-price fluctuations
also suggests a misunderstanding of the efficient market hypothesis. In its
outright refusal to consider share-price fluctuations in its materiality inquiry,
the Reys court ignores the efficient market hypothesis’s key implication that, in
an efficient market, all relevant material information is reflected in the share
price. Thus, share-price fluctuations are a relevant consideration in determining
104
105
materiality, although not dispositive on the issue.
In refusing consideration of share-price fluctuations, the Reys court
expressed concern that “distortions . . . prevent[ed] the ideal of a free and open
public market,” citing the Ninth Circuit’s decision in No. 84 Employer-Teamster
106
Joint Council Pension Trust Fund. However, the Reys court did not properly
consider the context of the Ninth Circuit’s statement. No. 84 EmployerTeamster was a private suit in which investors alleged that America West
101. Id. at 1174–75.
102. Id. at 1175.
103. See In re Apple Computer Sec. Litig., 886 F.2d 1109, 1116 (9th Cir. 1989) (“In order to avoid
Rule 10b–5 liability, any material information which insiders fail to disclose must be transmitted to the
public with a degree of intensity and credibility sufficient to effectively counterbalance any misleading
impression created by the insiders’ one-sided representations,” bearing in mind that “[t]he investing
public justifiably places heavy reliance on the statements and opinions of corporate insiders.”).
104. The efficient capital market hypothesis does not itself require that share-price fluctuations be
dispositive in a materiality inquiry; however, the hypothesis states that all material and relevant
information will be reflected in the share price of an efficiently traded security.
105. Dura Pharm., 544 U.S. 336, 343 (2005).
106. 712 F. Supp. 2d 1170, 1174 (W.D. Wash. 2010) (quoting No. 84 Employer-Teamster Joint
Council Pension Trust Fund v. Am. W. Holding Corp., 320 F.3d 920, 934 (9th Cir. 2003).
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Holding and its subsidiary (1) failed to inform investors of its “fail[ure] to
perform . . . required inspections and routine maintenance” and ongoing FAA
investigations of such failures in an effort to overstate income and (2) engaged
in a significant stock-repurchase plan as a ‘‘manipulative device designed to
107
further inflate its [stock] price” to benefit controlling shareholders. The
district court dismissed plaintiffs’ claims, finding the misrepresentations
“immaterial as a matter of law because the market did not immediately react”
to disclosures by the Wall Street Journal and the company of the FAA’s
108
potential and final imposed fines.
In reversing the district court, the Ninth Circuit, citing Basic, made the
statement cited by the Reys court—namely, that “distortions . . . prevent[ed] the
ideal of a free and open public market.” However, its next sentence clarifies
109
that these distortions may simply prevent immediate correction. The Ninth
110
Circuit rejected adoption of a “bright-line” rule, but did not challenge the idea
that the stock price reflects all material information. In that context, the Ninth
Circuit’s holding is consistent with the efficient market hypothesis’s principle
that information is captured almost instantaneously in the share price. If the
Reys court was merely concerned that immediate correction did not occur and
thus was not captured in the share price, then the court should have expanded
the examined time period, rather than rejecting outright Reys’s argument. If the
Reys court was instead concerned that all relevant market information was not
captured in the share price, the court should have questioned whether the
shares were offered on an efficient market—an inquiry the court never
conducted—rather than simply rejecting Reys’s argument.
The Reys court’s rejection of the truth-on-the-market defense to SEC
enforcement actions demonstrates a misunderstanding of the defense. As
suggested in part IV, the truth-on-the-market defense is properly grounded in
the materiality inquiry: Successful use of the defense requires the defendant to
show corrective information rendered the otherwise material misrepresentation
or omission immaterial. Although the SEC is not required to demonstrate
reliance or injury in enforcement actions, the SEC is required to demonstrate
materiality. Should a defendant demonstrate that the market had the full
picture of an issuer through corrective information of an “intensity and
credibility” equal to the alleged material misstatement or omission, the efficient
market hypothesis implies that the misstatement and corrective information
cancel each other out. By adopting a bright-line rule precluding the truth-onthe-market defense in SEC enforcement actions, the Reys court eliminated an
important vehicle for challenging the materiality of a misstatement without any
basis in precedent and in direct contravention of the efficient market
hypothesis.
107.
108.
109.
110.

No. 84 Employer-Teamster Joint Council Pension Trust Fund, 320 F.3d at 928, 930.
Id. at 934.
Id.
Id.
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B. SEC v. Mozilo
In SEC v. Mozilo, the SEC alleged that three senior executives of
Countrywide Financial Corporation (Countrywide) fraudulently made
“misleading statements in periodic filings and during earnings calls,
conferences, and investor presentations” regarding “the quality of
Countrywide’s underwriting guidelines and loan production,” its pay-option
111
ARM loans, and descriptions of its loans as “prime” or “nonprime.” The SEC
alleged violations of numerous securities laws and regulations, including section
112
10(b) of the Exchange Act and Rule 10b–5.
With respect to Countrywide’s underwriting guidelines and loan production,
the SEC alleged that the executives “made numerous public statements from
2005 through 2007, praising the quality of Countrywide’s underwriting and
113
distinguishing Countrywide from subprime lenders.”
These statements
included affirmative representations that (1) they were unaware of changes in
protocols or underwriting policies, (2) the company had “not taken any steps to
reduce the quality of its underwriting regimen,” and (3) Countrywide was not
114
involved in making subprime loans. The SEC alleged that defendants made
these statements while aware that “Countrywide was originating increasing
percentages of poor quality, subprime loans that did not comply with [its]
115
already lax underwriting guidelines.” Regarding pay-option ARM loans, the
SEC pointed to former CEO and Chairman of the Board Mozilo’s public
statements in 2005 and 2006 that “pay option loan quality remains extremely
high” and the product was a “sound investment” because loans were made only
to consumers “capable of making a higher payment, should that be required,
116
when they reach their reset period.” At the same time, Mozilo “expressed
grave concerns about the quality or viability of these loans” in internal
117
correspondence. Regarding Countrywide’s categorization of loans as “prime”
in public filings, the SEC alleged failure to “inform investors that it included
118
loans within its ‘prime’ category with increasing amounts of credit risk.”
Defendants argued that “the alleged statements and omissions were not
misleading or material as a matter of law in light of Countrywide’s extensive
disclosures about the risk characteristics of its loan originations in periodic SEC
filings, at investor forums, on free company-sponsored websites, and in
119
prospectus supplements filed by . . . subsidiaries.” Invoking the truth-on-themarket defense, defendants argued that, because “all publicly available
111. No. CV 09-3994 JFW, 2010 WL 3656068, at *1–2 (C.D. Cal. Sept. 16, 2010)
112. Id. at *6. The SEC also alleged violations of section 17(a) of the Securities Act of 1933 and
section 13(a) of the Exchange Act and various rules thereunder. Id.
113. Id. at *4.
114. Id.
115. Id.
116. Id.
117. Id. at *5.
118. Id.
119. Id. at *8.
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information is reflected in Countrywide’s stock price”—a fact conceded by the
SEC’s expert—“the omitted facts were known to investors and thus immaterial
120
as a matter of law.”
In response, the court labeled the defendant’s truth-on-the-market defense
“a corollary to the fraud on the market theory of reliance” and held that
defendants could not “replace the traditional analysis of materiality” with a
121
truth-on-the-market defense in an SEC enforcement action. Because the court
viewed the defense only as a corollary to the fraud-on-the-market theory of
reliance, the court focused on the fact that the SEC had not asserted the fraudon-the-market presumption of reliance. Citing the Ninth Circuit’s decision in
Miller v. Thane International, Inc., the court stated that “in an action that does
not involve the fraud on the market presumption, that truthful information is
available elsewhere does not relieve a defendant from liability for
122
misrepresentation in a given filing or statement.” The court then held, noting
the Reys decision, that “[b]ecause the SEC in an enforcement action is not
required to prove reliance, the ‘fraud on the market’ presumption is not
123
relevant.” Notably, the court explained that, in an SEC enforcement action,
“omissions by corporate insiders are not rendered immaterial as a matter of law
simply because the omitted facts were available to the public elsewhere” and
“the ‘total mix’ of information does not encompass the total universe of
124
information available in the public domain.” Instead, the court required that
the “information [be] so readily available that a reasonable investor would
consider it as part of the total mix of information,” rather than simply
125
incorporated in the security’s price. For these reasons, the court rejected the
truth-on-the-market defense in SEC enforcement actions.
The Mozilo court’s reasoning suggests a misunderstanding of the efficient
market hypothesis. First, the court’s statement that not all information in the
public domain is reflected in the total mix of information rejects the basic
premise of the efficient market hypothesis—namely, that all material public
information is reflected in the security’s price. The efficient market hypothesis
does not require that corrective information be “so readily available” that
reasonable investors consider it; rather, the market incorporates all material
information into a security’s price, so that investors access all material
information by noting the stock price.
Second, the court’s reliance on the Ninth Circuit’s decision in Miller v.
Thane International and, consequently, its statement that “in an action that does
not involve the fraud on the market presumption, that truthful information is

120. Id.
121. Id.
122. Id. at *9 (citing Miller v. Thane Int’l, Inc., 519 F.3d 879, 887 n.2 (9th Cir. 2008)).
123. Id. (citing SEC v. Reys, 712 F. Supp. 2d 1170, 1174 (W.D. Wash. 2010); SEC v. Rana Research,
Inc., 8 F.3d 1358, 1364 (9th Cir. 1993)).
124. Id.
125. Id.
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available elsewhere does not relieve a defendant from liability for
misrepresentation in a given filing or statement,” also reflects a
126
misunderstanding of the efficient market hypothesis. By taking the Ninth
Circuit’s decision out of context and applying it to the Mozilo case, the court
renders the holding incompatible with the efficient market hypothesis. The
Miller case involved private plaintiffs who alleged a violation of section 12(a)(2)
of the Exchange Act due to a misrepresentation that, postmerger, the
127
company’s stock would be listed on the NASDAQ exchange. Defendants
argued that, although earlier drafts of the prospectus stated that listing on the
NASDAQ or a national securities exchange was “a condition to the merger,”
the final prospectus language indicated merely that the postmerger stock had
been approved for NASDAQ listing and that the merged company would not
128
“continue as a public company.”
The language of section 12(a)(2) of the Exchange Act imposes different
requirements than section 10 of the Exchange Act, the violation at issue in
Mozilo. Section 12(a)(2) is violated if a plaintiff demonstrates that, in
conjunction with an offer or sale of a security conducted “by the use of a means
or instrumentality of interstate commerce” and “by means of a prospectus or
oral communication,” the prospectus “includes an untrue statement of material
fact or omits to state a material fact that is necessary to make the statements not
129
misleading.” Thus, in evaluating the section 12(a)(2) claim, the district court
and Ninth Circuit inquiries focused first on the specific language of the
prospectus and then on whether the language was material according to the
130
total-mix standard. Importantly, the defendants in Miller never asserted a
truth-on-the-market defense; rather, they argued first that the prospectus
statements were factually correct and then that the choice of market in which a
131
security trades is not material to a security. As such, the Ninth Circuit
comment quoted by the Mozilo court was not only dicta in the Miller case, but
was also given in response to a completely different set of circumstances in
which the defendants did not argue the presence of corrective information at
all.
Taken in context, the Ninth Circuit’s comment in Miller is not inconsistent
with the efficient market hypothesis: The Ninth Circuit was merely highlighting
the different considerations involved in adjudicating section 12(a)(2) claims and
section 10(b) claims. As the Ninth Circuit noted, “Section 12(a)(2) is a virtually
132
absolute liability provision.” Section 12(a)(2) restricts the inquiry to the
prospectus, so corrective information in another public filing cannot remove
126. Id. (citing Miller, 519 F.3d at 887 n.2).
127. Miller, 519 F.3d at 885. Plaintiffs also alleged violation of section 15 of the Exchange Act;
however, the materiality inquiry discussed here only related to the section 12(a)(2) allegation. Id.
128. Id. at 882–83.
129. Id. at 885.
130. Id. at 885–92.
131. Id.
132. Id. at 886.
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liability. However, section 10(b) and Rule 10b–5—the claims at issue in
Mozilo—evaluate the alleged misrepresentation “in the light of the
133
circumstances under which they were made.” Such circumstances should
include corrective information disseminated in an equally credible and intense
manner as the alleged misrepresentation, consistent with both the efficient
market hypothesis and In Re Apple Computer.
By considering the truth-on-the-market defense solely as a corollary to the
fraud-on-the-market presumption of reliance, the Mozilo court mistakenly
grounded the defense in the causation inquiry rather than the materiality
inquiry. Rather simplistically, the Mozilo court considered only the fact that the
SEC did not invoke the fraud-on-the-market presumption of reliance and
analogized the SEC to a private investor alleging actual reliance on the
particular misrepresentations. The court thus confused the causation and
materiality inquiries. As indicated in part IV, if a defendant successfully pleads
the truth-on-the-market defense, an otherwise material misrepresentation is
rendered immaterial by equally intense and credible corrective information:
Because the stock price reflects both the misrepresentation and the correction,
the two cancel each other out. Although this conclusion logically leads to the
determination that investors cannot have relied on that misrepresentation—
because investors cannot rely on immaterial information—and the chain of
causation is thus broken, the causation and materiality inquiries are indeed
distinct. In relegating the truth-on-the-market defense to merely a corollary of
the fraud-on-the-market presumption of reliance, the Mozilo court considered
the break in causation without considering the source of that break—namely,
the corrective information’s impact on the statement’s materiality. As a
consequence, the Mozilo court needlessly adopted a bright-line rule that bars
defendants from asserting the truth-on-the-market defense in SEC enforcement
actions.
The holdings of Reys and Mozilo highlight the potential for
misunderstanding the premises of the efficient market hypothesis and therefore
misapplying the truth-on-the-market defense. Because these courts
misunderstood the full implications of the efficient market hypothesis, the
courts were forced to resort to formalistic arguments and apply holdings outside
their relevant context. By considering the defense only in reference to
causation, without regard for its impact on materiality, these courts lowered the
SEC’s burden of proof for materiality and unduly limited defendants’ ability to
134
rebut allegations of materiality in SEC enforcement actions.

133. 17 C.F.R. § 240.10b–5 (2011).
134. Recall that proving a truth-on-the-market defense can be difficult, because it requires
demonstration of credible corrective information; therefore, it is quite possible that the defendants in
Reys and Mozilo may not have been able to meet this high bar and successfully present this defense,
rendering the courts’ decisions to foreclose the defense even more unnecessary.
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VI
SHOULD THE TRUTH-ON-THE-MARKET DEFENSE BE PERMITTED IN SEC
ENFORCEMENT ACTIONS?
As discussed in part IV, the truth-on-the-market defense is a judicially
created doctrine that evaluates materiality based on the premises of the
efficient market hypothesis. Because the defense is a product of judicial
decisions, precedent may also limit the use of the truth-on-the-market defense.
SEC v. Reys and SEC v. Mozilo apply such a limitation based on
misunderstandings of the efficient market hypothesis. Although the reasoning
employed in these particular cases is unpersuasive, the cases themselves raise an
interesting question: Is there any difference between the SEC and a private
litigant that warrants limitation of the truth-on-the-market defense to only
private suits?
As discussed in part III, requirements for a successful SEC action differ
from those of a private litigant. Courts base this special treatment of the SEC
on the statutory authority expressly granted by Congress’s designation of the
135
SEC “as the primary enforcement agency for the securities laws.” As such, the
SEC “has broad authority to initiate enforcement actions when a violation of
136
the securities laws has occurred, is occurring, or is about to occur.” The SEC
serves as a guardian for the integrity of U.S. capital markets: It seeks to not only
address injuries arising from securities fraud but also to deter actors in engaging
in any future fraud. Since material misrepresentations and omissions have great
potential to injure the basic integrity of securities markets, the SEC’s ability to
act without evidence of actual injury enables pursuit of deterrence objectives
and ensures well-functioning capital markets from which society benefits. For
these same reasons, the SEC may seek remedies unavailable to private
137
litigants. An SEC enforcement action is not merely “an action ‘under’ Rule
10b–5,” but rather a “creature[] of statute” granted direct authority under
138
sections 21(d) and (e) of the Securities Exchange Act. As such, courts are
willing to engage in somewhat expansive constructions of section 10 and Rule
139
10b–5, effectively affording the SEC special treatment.

135. SEC v. Rana Research, Inc., 8 F.3d 1358, 1363–64 (9th Cir. 1993) (citations omitted); see also
SEC v. Mgmt. Dynamics, Inc., 515 F.2d 801, 808 (2d Cir. 1975) (finding the SEC stands as a “statutory
guardian charged with safeguarding the public interest in enforcing the securities laws”); SEC v. Prater,
296 F. Supp. 2d 210, 215 (D. Conn. 2003) (adopting the Ninth Circuit’s Rana Research description of
the SEC as a “primary enforcement agency”).
136. James D. Cox & Randall S. Thomas, SEC Enforcement Heuristics: An Empirical Inquiry, 53
DUKE L.J. 737, 746 (2003). The article also provides further explanations for this special grant of
authority. Id. at 743–44.
137. See supra note 4 and sources cited therein.
138. Rana Research, 8 F.3d at 1363–64 (9th Cir. 1993) (citations omitted).
139. See, e.g., id. at 1362 (noting meaning of “in connection with” in SEC actions “remains as broad
and flexible as is necessary to accomplish the statute’s purpose of protecting investors”) (citations
omitted).
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However, the expansive role and authority of the SEC do not warrant
special treatment with respect to the materiality element of securities-fraud
claims and, therefore, do not provide a rationale for refusing the truth-on-themarket defense. Materiality remains an essential element of SEC enforcement
actions pursuant to not only case precedent, but also statutory language. For
instance, although the SEC is permitted by statute to issue freeze orders for
“threatened violation[s],” the statutes also require that violations be “likely to
result in significant dissipation or conversion of assets, significant harm to
140
investors, or substantial harm to the public interest.” Materiality is required to
demonstrate such “significant” or “substantial” harm, because immaterial
statements cannot create such harm. Further, the statute empowering the SEC
141
to assess monetary penalties explicitly requires that the statement be material.
Although the statute permitting the SEC to seek injunctions—perhaps its
142
broadest grant of authority —does not explicitly refer to materiality, it
references federal securities law, the rules of a national securities exchange, and
the rules of self-regulating organizations—which often incorporate a materiality
143
requirement. Finally, the SEC’s authority to issue cease-and-desist orders
permits the SEC to find, “after notice and opportunity for hearing, that any
person is violating, has violated, or is about to violate any provision of [Chapter
144
2B of the Exchange Act].” However, nothing in the statutory language
removes the materiality element from a 10b–5 violation.
Further, the broader mandate of the SEC does not warrant special
treatment in terms of demonstrating materiality. If a misstatement or omission
is not material, it cannot endanger the integrity of the broader capital markets
or harm investors. Under the efficient market hypothesis, the price of a security
traded on an efficient market reflects all relevant information: Immaterial
information is ignored in the price. Thus, requiring the SEC to demonstrate
materiality is proper.

140. 15 U.S.C. §§ 77 h-1(c)(1), 78 u-3(c)(1) (2006).
141. 15 U.S.C. § 78u-2(a)(1)(C) (Supp. VI 2012) (emphasis added).
142. See 15 U.S.C. § 78u(d)(1) (2006) (granting authority to seek injunctions “whenever it . . .
appear[s] . . . that any person is engaged or is about to engage in” violations of federal securities law, the
rules of a national securities exchange, or the other rules of a self-regulating organization of which that
person is a member upon a “proper showing”) (emphasis added).
143. For relevant securities-law provisions, see sources cited supra notes 140–142. See, e.g., MUN.
SEC. RULEMAKING BD. R. G-21(c), available at http://www.msrb.org/Rules-and-Interpretations/
MSRB-Rules/General/Rule-G-21.aspx (prohibiting members from “publish[ing] or disseminat[ing], or
caus[ing] to be published or disseminated, any product advertisement that such broker, dealer, or
municipal securities dealer knows or has reason to know is materially false or misleading”); NYSE R.
472(i), available at http://nyserules.nyse.com/NYSETools/PlatformViewer.asp?selectednode=chp_1_6&
manual=%2Fnyse%2Frules%2Fnyse-rules%2F (this rule refers explicitly to “material fact[s]” and has
been incorporated into FINRA rules); PUB. CO. ACCOUNTING OVERSIGHT BD. R. 3502, available at
http://pcaobus.org/Rules/PCAOBRules/Pages/Section_3.aspx#rule3502 (stating responsibility of
auditors to “not take or omit to take an action knowing, or recklessly not knowing, that the act or
omission would directly and substantially contribute to a violation . . . of the . . . provisions of the
securities laws”).
144. 15 U.S.C. § 78u-3(a) (2006) (emphasis added).
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The efficient market hypothesis posits that if both a misstatement and its
correction are made public, the market incorporates both, rendering the alleged
misrepresentation immaterial—and liability cannot attach if the
misrepresentation was immaterial. Since the SEC is required to demonstrate
materiality and the efficient market hypothesis does not distinguish between the
SEC or a private plaintiff, there is no reason to hold the truth-on-the-market
defense strictly inapplicable in SEC enforcement proceedings, as in Reys and
Mozilo. In evaluating materiality, courts should be guided by the standards of
TSC Industries, Basic Inc., In re Apple Computer, Dura Pharmaceuticals, and
the other cases discussed in part IV. The SEC as plaintiff should not affect the
materiality inquiry.
VII
CONCLUSION
Properly understood, the truth-on-the-market defense creates a vehicle
through which a defendant can rebut the alleged materiality of a misstatement
or omission. Since the SEC is required to demonstrate materiality of a
misrepresentation or omission and there is no theoretical or policy basis for
rejecting application of the truth-on-the-market defense against materiality in
SEC enforcement actions, a defendant should retain the ability to challenge
such materiality through the truth-on-the-market defense. The recent districtcourt rulings of SEC v. Reys and SEC v. Mozilo mistakenly employed reasoning
inconsistent with the efficient market hypothesis and the true grounding of the
truth-on-the-market doctrine in the materiality inquiry. In so doing, these
rulings needlessly constrict the value of the truth-on-the-market defense,
particularly in light of the difficulty in successfully proving this defense.

